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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MATOUMBA v. STATE: A POLICE OFFICER IS NOT
REQUIRED TO BE QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS
TO TESTIFY IN A SUPPRESSION HEARING REGARDING
FACTS THAT GAVE RISE TO A REASONABLE SUSPICION
JUSTIFYING A STOP AND FRISK OF A SUSPECT
By: Nancy Chung
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a police officer is not
required to be qualified as an expert witness in a suppression hearing
regarding facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a
stop and frisk of a suspect. Matoumba v. State, 390 Md. 544, 890
A.2d 288 (2006). In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a trial court has broad discretion in declining to use the
Maryland Rules of Evidence when determining preliminary questions
dealing with the admissibility of evidence.
Lieutenant Palmero ("Palmero") of the Baltimore City Firearms
Apprehension Strike Team and Officer Moynihan ("Moynihan") of the
Tactical Quick Response Team stopped a vehicle for speeding, in
which Kobie Matoumba ("Matoumba") was a passenger. Based on his
observations of Matoumba, Moynihan ordered Matoumba out of the
car and frisked him. Moynihan found a handgun in Matoumba's back
pocket.
Matoumba was charged with possession of a handgun by a person
previously convicted of a crime of violence. At Matoumba's hearing
on his motion to suppress, both Moynihan and Palmero were
questioned about their belief that Matoumba was armed, but neither
was qualified as an expert. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City held
that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk
Matoumba and accepted the testimony of both officers. Matoumba
waived his right to a jury, pled not guilty and proceeded on an agreed
statement of facts. He was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory
term of five years in prison without parole.
Matoumba appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed the ruling. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to consider "whether a police officer is required to be
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qualified as an expert when testifying at a suppression hearing as to his
or her basis for conducting a frisk."

In affirming the Court of Special Appeals' decision, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland rejected Matoumba's argument that Maryland
Rule 5-701 or Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968),
mandated that a police officer be qualified as an expert in order to
render an opinion on his or her basis for reasonable articulable
suspicion to conduct a frisk. !d. at *2.
Matoumba relied on the holding in Ragland v. State, stating
Maryland Rules 5-701 and 5-702 "prohibit the admission as 'lay
opinion' of testimony based upon specialized knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education." Id. (quoting Ragland v. State, 385
Md. 706, 725, 870 A.2d 609, 620 (2005)). The Court of Appeals of
Maryland distinguished Ragland from the case at bar by reasoning that
Ragland was directed to trial proceedings, and not pretrial proceedings
such as suppression hearings. Id. at *2. The Court refused to extend
Ragland to include suppression hearings. Id.
Rule 5-101(b)(12) states that the Maryland Rules of Evidence do
not apply to "[a]ny other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of
the rules in this Title, the court was traditionally not bound by the
common-law rules of evidence." Id. at *3 (quoting MD. R. EVID. 5101(b)(12)). In interpreting this rule, the Court determined that the
rules are inapplicable to suppression proceedings because the
common-law rules of evidence were not applied to such proceedings
before the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Id. at *4.
Furthermore, the Court relied on Rule 5-10 1(c)(1) which grants the
court discretion to decline to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence
pursuant to Rule 5-104(a). Id. at *5. Rule 5-105(a) of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence provides that "[p ]reliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by
the court." Id. at *3 (quoting MD. R. EVID. 5-105(a)). Therefore, the
Court concluded that because suppression hearings involve
determining preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of
evidence, the trial court has broad discretion to decline to strictly apply
the Rules of Evidence. Id. at *4.
The Court rejected Matoumba's argument that the issue here dealt
with the competency of a witness, which would mandate the
application of the Rules of Evidence in suppression hearings. Id. at *5.
The Court determined that Matoumba was mistaken as to the meaning
of "competency" as used in Rules 5-10 1 and 5-104. Id. The Court
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reasoned that the Rules refer to the traditional notion of competency,
meaning "that the witness has sufficient mental capacity to understand
the nature and obligation of an oath and is possessed of sufficient mind
and memory to observe, recollect, and narrate the things he or she has
seen or heard." Id. The "competency" of an expert witness to testify
and the witness' possession of knowledge sufficient to allow him or
her to testify on a specific matter were not contemplated in the Rules.
Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that based on this analysis,
the police officers were not required to be qualified as expert
witnesses before testifying at a suppression hearing as to the reasons
for Matoumba's frisk. /d. In addition, the Court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strictly apply the Rules
of Evidence. Id.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted trial courts
broad discretion to decline to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence in
determining preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of
evidence in a suppression hearing. This ruling may create a problem
to judicial efficiency, for the same issues regarding admissibility of
evidence may reoccur at the actual trial in which the Rules of
Evidence will have to be strictly applied. Nonetheless, the Court was
adhering to the Rules of Evidence in its ruling. The Rules of Evidence
may have to be reexamined to require the application of the rules to
preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence to
prevent the problem. Moreover, the rules should define "competency"
so that lay persons like Matoumba will not be mistaken as to its
meaning. Perhaps, the better word to describe what the rule meant by
"competency" is "capacity."

